Psi i ostali: ispovest Pavlovljevog psa

I nikad to vise ne zaboravis.

e, sad. u ovom slučaju (kaži ako dosadjujem), mozak nema ostvarenih veza. udarci su oštetili čeoni režanj (sad možda lupam, al' to je valjda to) i kada je očekivano da se centri upale, oni ne rade.
s' tim u vezi, pretpostavljam da takve osobe onda nemaju svest o počinjenim delima ili ti nedelima. (ili postoje blokatori koji im ne dozvoljavaju da se "odrede" u odnosu na...)

emocije.
(čovek iz moje priče nije rekao da je voleo svog sapatnika iz ćelije, već je nagovestio naklonost. takodje nije bio u stanju da opiše svoja osećanja, čak je rekao da ne oseća ništa. sad ja laički mogu da kažem da je možda problem ne u nedostatku emocija, već u ostvarivanju relacija sa istim. )
ako posmatram stvar iz tog ugla, onda mu dodje da nemogućnost iskazivanja (fensi: hendlovanja) emocionalnih konteksta i pod-konteksta deluje na onaj racionalni deo našeg bića. (sad još ako ubacimo onu priču: znam - pre nego li da imam svest da znam, stvari se bitno komplikuju, a još više ukolko li samo pomenem pojam empatije)

dalje, govor mu je bio delimično otežan. često nije mogao da nadje prave reči. neke rečenice su bile nepovezane.
njegovo sećanje, medjutim, je netaknuto (sad bi ovo trebalo pod navodnike, al' stavljam ih u zagradu, radi sugestije). pitanje je kakvu relaciju (ako tako mogu da kažem) je imao prema dogadjajima koji su mu se desili.

jedan deo mene ne želi da prizna da je to-to. (window closed - case closed)
verujem da još uvek nismo pronašli vrata koja bi omogućila da ono moje pitanje odozgo nadje nekakvu realizaciju.

evo šta kaže d. goleman
Logika emocionalnog uma je asocijativna, ona obuhvata elemente koji simbolizuju stvarnost ili podsećaju na nju da bi podsećala na stvarnost.

Funkcionisanje emocionalnog uma je, uvelikoj meri posebno stanje kojim, u odredjenom trenutku, upravlja osećanje koje je prethodilo. Način na koji reagujemo i mislimo kada smo zaljubljeni, potpuno se razlikuje od besa i depresije, u mehanici emocija svako osećanje ima poseban i odredjen repertoar misli, reakcija, čak i sećanja. Ovi repertoari "posebnog stanja" vladaju trenucima snažne emocije.

Selektivna memorija je jedan od znakova da ovaj repertoar postoji. Um delom odgovara na emocionalnu situaciju, aktivira pamćenje i moguće reakcije, tako da najvažnije emocije dolaze na vrh lestvice. I, kao što smo videli, svaka od osnovnih emocija ima osobenost sa biološkim potpisom - obrazac brisanja promena koje se "preseljavaju" u telo dok emocija postaje dominantna - i jedinstveni niz znakova koje telo automatski šalje kada se nadje pod njenom vlasti. (itd.itd. raspisah se.)

d. goleman

...mi bio asocijacija za ove prezentacije:
Dan Gilbert: Why are we happy? Why aren't we happy?
i na toj strani još:
Al Seckel
Your brain is badly wired -- enjoy it!

Ron Eglash
African fractals, in buildings and braids
Daniel Goleman: Why aren’t we all Good Samaritans?

...malo nedeljne zabave! :))

nsarski

Kljucno je sto se to desava u vreme formiranja modanih puteva, pa to iskustvo ostane sa detetom celog zivota. Najcesce takva deca, zrtve zlostavljanja, posle u zivotu ponavljaju to sto im se u detinjstvu desilo. Zlostavljana deca najcesce zavrse kao zivotno defektna, manje ili vise. Zato je od sudbinskog znacaja sa takvom decom raditi i izgraditi im samopouzdanje i drukciji pogled na svet.

Oces reci kljucne su posledice zlostavljanja.

Ja bih rekao ipak da je kljucan uzrok - t.j. zlostavljanje. Traume su posledice zlostavljanja, sto dovodi do deformacije potom

to me zdravicu podseti na klinku sto je odrasla u dzungli, odgajila je majmunica. nikada nije mogla da nauci da izgovara glasove kao ljudi samo te od gorile. sto me podseti da mozda svi ti neuroni, nervi ili sta vec, postaju jednostavno mrtvi i ne mogu se oziveti, reprogramirati itd...tako je kako je.

∑
misliš ovako?
i ovako
Ζ Ω Σ δ ξ Ϋ?

probaj iz word-a

nsarski

Pa, velicanstvo, Ameri su primetili da se nesto cudno desava sa njihovim vojnicima zarobljenim u Vijetnamu, Vijetnamci su primenjivali neke metode na njima, ali se nije znalo koje. Sda posto su vijetnamce u to vreme podrzavali Sovjeti, nije tesko zakljuciti odakle Vijetnamcima ta znanja:)

Kladim se da je tu mrtva trka. Sta su trazili u Vijetnamu i jedni i drugi?
Kad god mi navedes jedan primer grozng ponasanja jednih (bilo kojih) ja cu ti vratiti istom merom) Za ovaj put ti navodim divan narandžasti gas!
Inace, toliko sam mator i lenj da koristim copy/paste kad god mogu, iz cega god ga kopiras i uradis paste u komentar - uspeva. Ja negde nasao formulu i kliknuo c/p.

Koliko su neophodne neke drasticne mere da bi se sistem doveo na ivicu kolapsa, odnosno, da li u duzem vremenskom periodu i nesto sto na prvi pogled ne deluje kao ekstremni poremecaj moze coveka da dovede u ovo stanje. Naprimer, stalno prisustvo nekog neresenog problema, stalno ponavljanje jedne te iste stvari, tinjajuci konflikti sa nekim ljudima iz okruzenja ili ... nesto jos jednostavnije .... umor. Koliko konstantna neispavanost, naprezanja na poslu ili bilo gde drugde u duzem vremenskom periodu, moze da dovede ljude u stanje na ivici kolapsa u kome prihvataju odredjenu rutine i pocinju da se ponasaju malte ne kao zombiji. Kolike stotine hiljada i miliona ljudi u sustini imaju zombilike organizovan zivot. Zasto se uopste pretpostavlja da je zombi vojnik prebegao iz nekog diktatorskog rezima, ili vudu zanesenjak. Mnogo produktivniji zombi bio bi neko ko radi 12 sati dnevno, zaradjuje silnu lovu firmi i zemlji u kojoj se zatekao, placa basnoslovan kredit za neku smesnu nekretninu, svaku banalnu uslugu u zivotu placa basnoslovno (obrazovanje, zdravstvo) .... pored 12 sati rada jos 2 sata trosi na put od kuce do posla ... i jos povrh svega je konstantno umoran, poludepresivan, i uplasen (bilo od gubitka posla, bilo od guzve na narednoj raskrsnici).

Mozda nije potreban LSD, psihodelicna muzika, elektro sokovi, i neka virtuelna agresivna realnost ... mozda je za dobrog zombija dovoljna samo jedna stvar ... neispavanost, nervoza i umor.

A uz umor ide i razdrazljivost + los san.

"The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate the unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power. We are governed, our minds moulded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested largely by men we have never heard of. This is a logical result of the way in which our democratic society is organized. Vast numbers of human beings must cooperate if they are to live together as a smoothly functioning society. In almost every act of our lives, whether in the sphere of politics or business, in our social conduct or our ethical thinking, we are dominated by the relatively small number of persons who understand the mental processes and social patterns of the masses. It is they who pull the wires that control the public mind."
Edward Bernays

ne mogu interview da "upload" iz foldera
ali možda nešto slično smislim....

EDIT:
Stuart Ewen PR Chapter 1

Edward Bernays "History is a weapon"

Interview Edward Bernays
Communication World, Jan, 1992 by Alvin M. Hattal
interview 4 pages

Nisam znao za Bernaysa, ali me je ovo sto ste o njemu napisali asociralo na jednog drugog coveka iz u.s. istorije ... poznatog P.T. Barnum-a ... rodonacelnika modernog marketinga, pr-a. Kada su ga pitali sta se nalazi u korenu njegovih marketinskih uspeha, rekao je (mada je to kasnije poricano):

There's a sucker born every minute

Takodje, prelistavajuci google naisao sam na sajtove koji povezuju Barnama i Bernaysa, kao pretecu i naslednika:

For many, the concept of “public relations” is more likely to be associated with P.T. Barnum, than E.L. Bernays and with “propaganda” rather than “publicity"

Na kraju mu dodje da je Istocna Evropa, sto kroz komunizam sto kroz neke druge stvari koje se i sada plasiraju, nekome (pored super prilike da plasira svoje kredite i dugorocne investicije u nazi, komi pokrete, razne old and new age kultove) posluzila i kao poligon za eksperimentisanje novih psiholoskih teorija, teorija organizacije, teorija marketinga, medicinskih metoda ...

Negde sam cuo (mada neodoljivo lici na teoriju zavere) da je naprimer samoupravljanje bilo socioloski i antropoloski eksperiment koordinisan i finansiran od dande :), a nas 20-ak miliona smo mu dosli kao opitni kunici ... odabrani drugovi su mu dosli kao lokalni rukovodioci projekta, koji su revnosno slali izvestaje di je trebalo i naravno za to dobili adekvatnu kompenzaciju sto u titulama sto u novcu.

Takodje, cuo sam da je naprimer i G. Otok pored onoga sto je stvarno bio, bio i opitni centar u kome su isprobane neke nove metode kontrole i manipulacije grupom, za cije rezultate su se kasnije zainteresovali i mnogi odakle treba. Cuo sam da je G. Otok u teoriji organizacije zaslusan za patentiranje pojma samokontrole grupe (sistem je bio organizovan tako da su se zatvorenici sami medju sobom kontrolisali, kaznjavali, cinkarili ... ). Mozda je ideja samoupravljanja upravo odatle i potekla.

Takodje, ima nekih koji tvrde da su metode organizacije koje su nacisti koristili bilo prilikom organizovanja svoje ratne proizvodnje bilo prilikom organizovanja masovnih zlocina ... kasnije sa stanovista psilogije mase i teorije organizacije podrobno izucavane od strane sila pobednica (naprimer, A. Sper poznati ministar ratne industrije Nemacke, izgleda da je ostavljen u zivotu posle II svetskog rata i iz ovih razloga, bar tako neki tvrde).

INTERVIEWING CHOMSKY

by Radio B92, Belgrade, 9/18/1

Q: Why do you think these attacks happened?

Chomksy: To answer the question we must first identify the perpetrators of the crimes. It is generally assumed, plausibly, that their origin is the Middle East region, and that the attacks probably trace back to the Osama Bin Laden network, a widespread and complex organization, doubtless inspired by Bin Laden but not necessarily acting under his control. Let us assume that this is true. Then to answer your question a sensible person would try to ascertain Bin Laden's views, and the sentiments of the large reservoir of supporters he has throughout the region. About all of this, we have a great deal of information. Bin Laden has been interviewed extensively over the years by highly reliable Middle East specialists, notably the most eminent correspondent in the region, Robert Fisk (London Independent), who has intimate knowledge of the entire region and direct experience over decades. A Saudi Arabian millionaire, Bin Laden became a militant Islamic leader in the war to drive the Russians out of Afghanistan. He was one of the many religious fundamentalist extremists recruited, armed, and financed by the CIA and their allies in Pakistani intelligence to cause maximal harm to the Russians -- quite possibly delaying their withdrawal, many analysts suspect -- though whether he personally happened to have direct contact with the CIA is unclear, and not particularly important. Not surprisingly, the CIA preferred the most fanatic and cruel fighters they could mobilize. The end result was to "destroy a moderate regime and create a fanatical one, from groups recklessly financed by the Americans" (London Times correspondent Simon Jenkins, also a specialist on the region). These "Afghanis" as they are called (many, like Bin Laden, not from Afghanistan) carried out terror operations across the border in Russia, but they terminated these after Russia withdrew. Their war was not against Russia, which they despise, but against the Russian occupation and Russia's crimes against Muslims.

The "Afghanis" did not terminate their activities, however. They joined Bosnian Muslim forces in the Balkan Wars; the US did not object, just as it tolerated Iranian support for them, for complex reasons that we need not pursue here, apart from noting that concern for the grim fate of the Bosnians was not prominent among them. The "Afghanis" are also fighting the Russians in Chechnya, and, quite possibly, are involved in carrying out terrorist attacks in Moscow and elsewhere in Russian territory. Bin Laden and his "Afghanis" turned against the US in 1990 when they established permanent bases in Saudi Arabia -- from his point of view, a counterpart to the Russian occupation of Afghanistan, but far more significant because of Saudi Arabia's special status as the guardian of the holiest shrines.

Bin Laden is also bitterly opposed to the corrupt and repressive regimes of the region, which he regards as "un-Islamic," including the Saudi Arabian regime, the most extreme Islamic fundamentalist regime in the world, apart from the Taliban, and a close US ally since its origins. Bin Laden despises the US for its support of these regimes. Like others in the region, he is also outraged by long-standing US support for Israel's brutal military occupation, now in its 35th year: Washington's decisive diplomatic, military, and economic intervention in support of the killings, the harsh and destructive siege over many years, the daily humiliation to which Palestinians are subjected, the expanding settlements designed to break the occupied territories into Bantustan-like cantons and take control of the resources, the gross violation of the Geneva Conventions, and other actions that are recognized as crimes throughout most of the world, apart from the US, which has prime responsibility for them. And like others, he contrasts Washington's dedicated support for these crimes with the decade-long US-British assault against the civilian population of Iraq, which has devastated the society and caused hundreds of thousands of deaths while strengthening Saddam Hussein -- who was a favored friend and ally of the US and Britain right through his worst atrocities, including the gassing of the Kurds, as people of the region also remember well, even if Westerners prefer to forget the facts. These sentiments are very widely shared. The Wall Street Journal (Sept. 14) published a survey of opinions of wealthy and privileged Muslims in the Gulf region (bankers, professionals, businessmen with close links to the U.S.). They expressed much the same views: resentment of the U.S. policies of supporting Israeli crimes and blocking the international consensus on a diplomatic settlement for many years while devastating Iraqi civilian society, supporting harsh and repressive anti-democratic regimes throughout the region, and imposing barriers against economic development by "propping up oppressive regimes." Among the great majority of people suffering deep poverty and oppression, similar sentiments are far more bitter, and are the source of the fury and despair that has led to suicide bombings, as commonly understood by those who are interested in the facts.

The U.S., and much of the West, prefers a more comforting story. To quote the lead analysis in the New York Times (Sept. 16), the perpetrators acted out of "hatred for the values cherished in the West as freedom, tolerance, prosperity, religious pluralism and universal suffrage." U.S. actions are irrelevant, and therefore need not even be mentioned (Serge Schmemann). This is a convenient picture, and the general stance is not unfamiliar in intellectual history; in fact, it is close to the norm. It happens to be completely at variance with everything we know, but has all the merits of self-adulation and uncritical support for power.

It is also widely recognized that Bin Laden and others like him are praying for "a great assault on Muslim states," which will cause "fanatics to flock to his cause" (Jenkins, and many others.). That too is familiar. The escalating cycle of violence is typically welcomed by the harshest and most brutal elements on both sides, a fact evident enough from the recent history of the Balkans, to cite only one of many cases.

Q: What consequences will they have on US inner policy and to the American self reception?

Chomsky: US policy has already been officially announced. The world is being offered a "stark choice": join us, or "face the certain prospect of death and destruction." Congress has authorized the use of force against any individuals or countries the President determines to be involved in the attacks, a doctrine that every supporter regards as ultra-criminal. That is easily demonstrated. Simply ask how the same people would have reacted if Nicaragua had adopted this doctrine after the U.S. had rejected the orders of the World Court to terminate its "unlawful use of force" against Nicaragua and had vetoed a Security Council resolution calling on all states to observe international law. And that terrorist attack was far more severe and destructive even than this atrocity.

As for how these matters are perceived here, that is far more complex. One should bear in mind that the media and the intellectual elites generally have their particular agendas. Furthermore, the answer to this question is, in significant measure, a matter of decision: as in many other cases, with sufficient dedication and energy, efforts to stimulate fanaticism, blind hatred, and submission to authority can be reversed. We all know that very well.

Q: Do you expect U.S. to profoundly change their policy to the rest of the world?

Chomsky: The initial response was to call for intensifying the policies that led to the fury and resentment that provides the background of support for the terrorist attack, and to pursue more intensively the agenda of the most hard line elements of the leadership: increased militarization, domestic regimentation, attack on social programs. That is all to be expected. Again, terror attacks, and the escalating cycle of violence they often engender, tend to reinforce the authority and prestige of the most harsh and repressive elements of a society. But there is nothing inevitable about submission to this course.

Q: After the first shock, came fear of what the U.S. answer is going to be. Are you afraid, too?

Chomsky: Every sane person should be afraid of the likely reaction -- the one that has already been announced, the one that probably answers Bin Laden's prayers. It is highly likely to escalate the cycle of violence, in the familiar way, but in this case on a far greater scale.

The U.S. has already demanded that Pakistan terminate the food and other supplies that are keeping at least some of the starving and suffering people of Afghanistan alive. If that demand is implemented, unknown numbers of people who have not the remotest connection to terrorism will die, possibly millions. Let me repeat: the U.S. has demanded that Pakistan kill possibly millions of people who are themselves victims of the Taliban. This has nothing to do even with revenge. It is at a far lower moral level even than that. The significance is heightened by the fact that this is mentioned in passing, with no comment, and probably will hardly be noticed. We can learn a great deal about the moral level of the reigning intellectual culture of the West by observing the reaction to this demand. I think we can be reasonably confident that if the American population had the slightest idea of what is being done in their name, they would be utterly appalled. It would be instructive to seek historical precedents.

If Pakistan does not agree to this and other U.S. demands, it may come under direct attack as well -- with unknown consequences. If Pakistan does submit to U.S. demands, it is not impossible that the government will be overthrown by forces much like the Taliban -- who in this case will have nuclear weapons. That could have an effect throughout the region, including the oil producing states. At this point we are considering the possibility of a war that may destroy much of human society.

Even without pursuing such possibilities, the likelihood is that an attack on Afghans will have pretty much the effect that most analysts expect: it will enlist great numbers of others to support of Bin Laden, as he hopes. Even if he is killed, it will make little difference. His voice will be heard on cassettes that are distributed throughout the Islamic world, and he is likely to be revered as a martyr, inspiring others. It is worth bearing in mind that one suicide bombing -- a truck driven into a U.S. military base -- drove the world's major military force out of Lebanon 20 years ago. The opportunities for such attacks are endless. And suicide attacks are very hard to prevent.

Q: "The world will never be the same after 11.09.01". Do you think so?

Chomsky: The horrendous terrorist attacks on Tuesday are something quite new in world affairs, not in their scale and character, but in the target. For the US, this is the first time since the War of 1812 that its national territory has been under attack, even threat. Its colonies have been attacked, but not the national territory itself. During these years the US virtually exterminated the indigenous population, conquered half of Mexico, intervened violently in the surrounding region, conquered Hawaii and the Philippines (killing hundreds of thousands of Filipinos), and in the past half century particularly, extended its resort to force throughout much of the world. The number of victims is colossal. For the first time, the guns have been directed the other way. The same is true, even more dramatically, of Europe. Europe has suffered murderous destruction, but from internal wars, meanwhile conquering much of the world with extreme brutality. It has not been under attack by its victims outside, with rare exceptions (the IRA in England, for example). It is therefore natural that NATO should rally to the support of the US; hundreds of years of imperial violence have an enormous impact on the intellectual and moral culture.

It is correct to say that this is a novel event in world history, not because of the scale of the atrocity -- regrettably -- but because of the target. How the West chooses to react is a matter of supreme importance. If the rich and powerful choose to keep to their traditions of hundreds of years and resort to extreme violence, they will contribute to the escalation of a cycle of violence, in a familiar dynamic, with long-term consequences that could be awesome. Of course, that is by no means inevitable. An aroused public within the more free and democratic societies can direct policies towards a much more humane and honorable course.

evo odlomka iz eseya force and opinion by noam chomsky;


In accordance with the prevailing conceptions, there is no infringement of democracy if a few corporations control the information system: in fact, that is the essence of democracy. The leading figure of the public relations industry, Edward Bernays, explained that "the very essence of the democratic process" is "the freedom to persuade and suggest," what he calls "the engineering of consent." If the freedom to persuade happens to be concentrated in a few hands, we must recognize that such is the nature of a free society.

Bernays expressed the basic point in a public relations manual of 1928: "The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society... It is the intelligent minorities which need to make use of propaganda continuously and systematically." Given its enormous and decisive power, the highly class conscious business community of the United States has been able to put these lessons to effective use. Bernays' advocacy of propaganda is cited by Thomas McCann, head of public relations for the United Fruit Company, for which Bernays provided signal service in preparing the ground for the overthrow of Guatemalan democracy in 1954, a major triumph of business propaganda with the willing compliance of the media.

The intelligent minorities have long understood this to be their function. Walter Lippmann described a "revolution" in "the practice of democracy" as "the manufacture of consent" has become "a self-conscious art and a regular organ of popular government." This is a natural development when public opinion cannot be trusted: "In the absence of institutions and education by which the environment is so successfully reported that the realities of public life stand out very sharply against self-centered opinion, the common interests very largely elude public opinion entirely, and can be managed only by a specialized class whose personal interests reach beyond the locality," and are thus able to perceive "the realities." These are the men of best quality, who alone are capable of social and economic management.

It follows that two political roles must be clearly distinguished, Lippmann goes on to explain. First, there is the role assigned to the specialized class, the "insiders," the "responsible men," who have access to information and understanding. Ideally, they should have a special education for public office, and should master the criteria for solving the problems of society: "In the degree to which these criteria can be made exact and objective, political decision," which is their domain, "is actually brought into relation with the interests of men." The "public men" are, furthermore, to "lead opinion" and take the responsibility for "the formation of a sound public opinion." "They initiate, they administer, they settle," and should be protected from "ignorant and meddlesome outsiders," the general public, who are incapable of dealing "with the substance of the problem." The criteria we apply to government are success in satisfying material and cultural wants, not whether "it vibrates to the self-centered opinions that happen to be floating in men's minds." Having mastered the criteria for political decision, the specialized class, protected from public meddling, will serve the public interest -- what is called "the national interest" in the webs of mystification spun by the academic social sciences and political commentary.

The second role is "the task of the public," which is much more limited. It is not for the public, Lippmann observes, to "pass judgment on the intrinsic merits" of an issue or to offer analysis or solutions, but merely, on occasion, to place "its force at the disposal" of one or another group of "responsible men." The public "does not reason, investigate, invent, persuade, bargain, or settle." Rather, "the public acts only by aligning itself as the partisan of someone in a position to act executively," once he has given the matter at hand sober and disinterested thought. It is for this reason that "the public must be put in its place." The bewildered herd, trampling and roaring, "has its function": to be "the interested spectators of action," not participants. Participation is the duty of "the responsible man."

These ideas, described by Lippmann's editors as a progressive "political philosophy for liberal democracy," have an unmistakeable resemblance to the Leninist concept of a vanguard party that leads the masses to a better life that they cannot conceive or construct on their own. In fact, the transition from one position to the other, from Leninist enthusiasm to "celebration of America," has proven quite an easy one over the years. This is not surprising, since the doctrines are similar at their root. The critical difference lies in an assessment of the prospects for power: through exploitation of mass popular struggle, or service to the current masters.

There is, clearly enough, an unspoken assumption behind the proposals of Lippmann and others: the specialized class are offered the opportunity to manage public affairs by virtue of their subordination to those with real power -- in our societies, dominant business interests -- a crucial fact that is ignored in the self-praise of the elect.

...ali sam se ustrucavao da zalazim u "politicke" vode - kao da je to nesto prljavo, jbt.!

?que? :))
ma nije!

samo ponekad liči....

Covek ima svoj blog ovde koji redovno citam, ali to je ovde nepristojno reci:)

:))
Like I don`t know! :)

. "Oni nas ne mrze zato sto sirimo demokraciju, slobodu, napredak i blagostanje, nego zato sto cinimo stvari vrijedne mrznje."

(Bishop Robert Bowman, Florida; about 09/11)

"To je velika šansa za nenasilje - a big chance for non-violence."

(Dalaj Lama for CNN, Sept.13 2001, about Sept.11)

Prokockana šansa.