Žižek o Kosovu, Srbima i Albancima

Mogla bih ali oni nisu sa prostora bivse SFRJ i zadovoljavaju itekako moje kriterijume

Grofice,

Nemojte da budete tako sebicni, pravi aristokrati daju sirotinji barem mrvice sa svog stola. Evo, ja ne trazim od Vas da navedete nekog relevantnog filozofa sa prostora bivse SFRJ. Navedite bilo koga, iz bilo kog kraja Evrope i sveta.

Unapred zahvalan,
M.

Grofice,

Nemojte da budete tako sebicni, pravi aristokrati daju sirotinji barem mrvice sa svog stola. Evo, ja ne trazim od Vas da navedete nekog relevantnog filozofa sa prostora bivse SFRJ. Navedite bilo koga, iz bilo kog kraja Evrope i sveta.

Unapred zahvalan,
M.
*novo

Ne, ne, nema to nikakve veze sa aristokratijom nego samo sa licnim izborom. Ipak ne bih da uticem na Vas izbor a kako ne biste sve vise umnozavali vase predrasude o mojoj aristokratskoj malenkosti.:))) Znate, ni aristokrate nisu vise sto su bile. Nedaju se lako provocirati.:)))))

@bastard

Hvala, ne bih da se vadim na bolest, ali recimo da sam zbog toga potpuno pogresno razumeo sta ste hteli da kazete :)
Pozdrav

Soylent Green

Najparadoksalnija stvar kod Zizeka je sto je dok putuje (a predpostavljam i inace) uvek okruzen gomilom lepih zena, koje kao da su sisle sa catwalk-a, a pred mojim ocima je priznao da mu je mali:

Samo iskompleksirani muskarac sebe dokazuje cestim promenama zena.

G r o f i c a

Samo iskompleksirani muskarac sebe dokazuje cestim promenama zena.

Prvo, Zizek ih ne menja nego dodaje i gomila, sto je mnogo ispravnija strategija.

Drugo, za razliku od ostalih postmodernih filozofa cije su vencane zene po pravilu najruznije od svih zena u njihovom okruzenju, Zizekova je najlepsa (22-godisnja cerka argentinskih lakanovaca-psihoanaliticara.)

Drugim recima, Zizekova filozofija funkcionise.

Samo iskompleksirani muskarac sebe dokazuje cestim promenama zena.

Sada vidim da Vas problem sa Zizekom nije bas filozofske prirode...:)

P.S.

Grofice,

To sto Zizek ne odgovara Vasem aristokratskom ukusu (vladajuce klase), neko bi mogao da shvati kao preporuku za citanje Zizeka.

Drugim recima, Zizekova filozofija funkcionise.

Ta filozofija funkcionise kod odredjene kategorije isto tako iskompleksiranih cura kojima treba tata a ne muskarac kao partner.

Sada vidim da Vas problem sa Zizekom nije bas filozofske prirode...:)

Hahahaha...bas me zasmejavate. ko je Zizek filozof ja sam astronaut a ne G r o f i c a. :)

Hahahaha...bas me zasmejavate. ko je Zizek filozof ja sam astronaut a ne G r o f i c a. :)

Grofice,

To su veoma bliske perspektive, perspektiva astronauta i perspektiva aristokrate:)

Odakle ovolika doza netrpeljivosti prema Zizeku? Gde su argumenti? Da bi se jedan filozof kritikovao mora se najpre citati, right? Ne mislim da je bila namera autora ovog posta da pokrene gossip o Zizekovim zenama.

Vanja Montenegro Ljujic

Odakle ovolika doza netrpeljivosti prema Zizeku? Gde su argumenti? Da bi se jedan filozof kritikovao mora se najpre citati, right? Ne mislim da je bila namera autora ovog posta da pokrene gossip o Zizekovim zenama.

Vanja, ne radi se o prekomernoj dozi ''netrpeljivosti'' prema Zizeku.
On samo ne mora da bude izbor svake dame.:)))
Ima nas koji preferiramo druge filozofe, one koji stvarno imaju nesto da kazu.

To su veoma bliske perspektive, perspektiva astronauta i perspektiva aristokrate:)

:))))))))))))

Ima nas koji preferiramo druge filozofe, one koji stvarno imaju nesto da kazu.

Ali i dalje ne nameravate da nam otvorite oci?

Vanja Montenegro Ljujic

Odakle ovolika doza netrpeljivosti prema Zizeku? Gde su argumenti? Da bi se jedan filozof kritikovao mora se najpre citati, right?

Ja ni slucajno nisam netrpeljiv prema SZ, cak sam mu dao prilicne pare kroz kupovinu knjiga, i ovde sam hteo da ga pohvalim konstatacijom da njegov opus, pored standardnog obezbedjivanja redovnih prihoda kao kod drugih filozofa, ima i dodatnu primenjenu komponentu - obezbedjivanje lepih zena. Mnogi mogu da bs-uju za tenure i salonsku zabavu, ali su malobrojni filozofi koji nadju i dodatnu primenu svoje filozofije.

Drugim recima, Zizek vodi 2:1 i predstavlja uzor i podstrek svima onima koji filozofiju zele da izdignu na visu ravan.

Ali i dalje ne nameravate da nam otvorite oci?

:) Pa kasno je vec.:)

Ali i dalje ne nameravate da nam otvorite oci?

Dobro, kad ste vec navalili, evo nekoliko i zasto bas oni;

Pythagoras (kazao je da stvarnost ima deset strana, zabranio da se jede pasulj zato sto preseceno zrno pasulja lici na zacetak ljudskog zivota :)

Socrates (uvek bio oskudno obucen, hodao bosonog i znao je jedino da nista ne zna.:)

Plato (rodjen od aristokratskih roditelja, uzasavao se politickog nereda i znao je da dobra vlast nikada ne bi osudila coveka kao sto je Socrates)

Aristoteles (stajao obema nogama na zemlji, znao je da hrastovo drvo moze da izraste iz jednog zira iako citava hrpa padne na plodno tlo)

Descartes (bio sumnjicav, njegove oci su videle velike stvari kao male u daljini, pitao se da li on stvarno postoji jer je to mogao da bude i san jednog sanjanog coveculjka)

Spinoza (bio ljubazan covek sa manirima, odbio prijem na univerzitet jer nije hteo da se odrekne svojih ideja, nije naplacivao za svoj talenat, ziveo je od ostrenja sociva, ziveo od SVOJE filozofije zbog cega su ga mnogi mrzeli sto su mu jedino i mogli)

Kant (covek od navika, sve radio u isto vreme pa cak i setao uvek u isto vreme, ziveo izuzetno mirno cak i usporeno)

Nietsche (smatrao je da hriscanska vera oduzima ljudima mogucnost da budu najbolji i da ljudi nisu stvoreni kao isti)

Wittgenstein (imao ambicija da filozofiju privede kraju i cinilo mu se da je to 2x i uspeo. Bio je smeo, brilijantan, sarmantan, arogantan, kratak i jasan, govornik…njegova filozofija je bila pre konfuzna nego bezgresna. Bio je ustvari dva filozofa koja su se medjusobno slagala. Casove je davao u lezecem stavu sto ga je cinilo posebnim .:)

A ima jos.:)))

G r o f i c a

Ali i dalje ne nameravate da nam otvorite oci?Dobro, kad ste vec navalili, evo nekoliko i zasto bas oni;Pythagoras (kazao je da stvarnost ima deset strana, zabranio da se jede pasulj zato sto preseceno zrno pasulja lici na zacetak ljudskog zivota :)Socrates (uvek bio oskudno obucen, hodao bosonog i znao je jedino da nista ne zna.:)Plato (rodjen od aristokratskih roditelja, uzasavao se politickog nereda i znao je da dobra vlast nikada ne bi osudila coveka kao sto je Socrates) Aristoteles (stajao obema nogama na zemlji, znao je da hrastovo drvo moze da izraste iz jednog zira iako citava hrpa padne na plodno tlo)Descartes (bio sumnjicav, njegove oci su videle velike stvari kao male u daljini, pitao se da li on stvarno postoji jer je to mogao da bude i san jednog sanjanog coveculjka)Spinoza (bio ljubazan covek sa manirima, odbio prijem na univerzitet jer nije hteo da se odrekne svojih ideja, nije naplacivao za svoj talenat, ziveo je od ostrenja sociva, ziveo od SVOJE filozofije zbog cega su ga mnogi mrzeli sto su mu jedino i mogli)Kant (covek od navika, sve radio u isto vreme pa cak i setao uvek u isto vreme, ziveo izuzetno mirno cak i usporeno)Nietsche (smatrao je da hriscanska vera oduzima ljudima mogucnost da budu najbolji i da ljudi nisu stvoreni kao isti)Wittgenstein (imao ambicija da filozofiju privede kraju i cinilo mu se da je to 2x i uspeo. Bio je smeo, brilijantan, sarmantan, arogantan, kratak i jasan, govornik…njegova filozofija je bila pre konfuzna nego bezgresna. Bio je ustvari dva filozofa koja su se medjusobno slagala. Casove je davao u lezecem stavu sto ga je cinilo posebnim .:)A ima jos.:)))

Vas poslednji veliki filozof je umro 1951. Molim vas, gde su oni potonji, Foucault , Derrida...?
Boze, tek sada vidim koliko ima sati! Bezim. Laku noc!

Vas poslednji veliki filozof je umro 1951. Molim vas, gde su oni potonji, Foucault , Derrida...?
Boze, tek sada vidim koliko ima sati! Bezim. Laku noc!

Pa lepo sam rekla da ima jos.
A bilo je i kasno.:)))))))))

Vas poslednji veliki filozof je umro 1951. Molim vas, gde su oni potonji, Foucault , Derrida...?

He, Vanja, tek sada vidim da ni vasi nisu mnogo mladji, Foucault je rodjen 1930 a ni Derida nije bio bas mnogo mladji iako je umro tek 2000.g.. Dajte Vi neke Vase mladje i zbog cega.

pozz.

Hegel, Grofice?

Iako veliki poklonik francuske revolucije, prevodilac Marseljeze na nemacki, "dijalekticar", pouzdano je zabelezno da je bio dete finog burzoaskog bekgraunda i vlasnik jos finijih manira ( pijenje piva sa studentima i jedenje pasulja po kojima je bio poznat se, recimo, ne racuna :)

leto dijalektike

Hegel, Grofice?Iako veliki poklonik francuske revolucije, prevodilac Marseljeze na nemacki, dijalekticar, pouzdano je zabelezno da je bio dete finog burzoaskog bekgraunda i vlasnik jos finijih manira ( pijenje piva sa studentima i jedenje pasulja po kojima je bio poznat se, recimo, ne racuna :)

Thanks.:) Gde bas njega da zaboravim? :)))

G r o f i c a

Vanja Montenegro LjujicOdakle ovolika doza netrpeljivosti prema Zizeku? Gde su argumenti? Da bi se jedan filozof kritikovao mora se najpre citati, right? Ne mislim da je bila namera autora ovog posta da pokrene gossip o Zizekovim zenama. Vanja, ne radi se o prekomernoj dozi ''netrpeljivosti'' prema Zizeku. On samo ne mora da bude izbor svake dame.:)))Ima nas koji preferiramo druge filozofe, one koji stvarno imaju nesto da kazu.

Ali, nikako da shvatimo ko su dotični.

Kako ne razumete, kod Grofice imaju sansu samo oni filozofi koji nemaju sanse kod (drugih) zena:)

[

Drugo, za razliku od ostalih postmodernih filozofa cije su vencane zene po pravilu najruznije od svih zena u njihovom okruzenju, Zizekova je najlepsa (22-godisnja cerka argentinskih lakanovaca-psihoanaliticara.)

Drugim recima, Zizekova filozofija funkcionise.

Hahaaa, pa fizicari nisu bas poznati kao veliki flozofi.
OK, drugo pitanje iz oblasti trendova, modernih dogadjaja i ostalo. Danas je u NY Timesu izasao tekst o tome da se u USA 1 u 100 odraslih osoba nalazi u zatvoru, sto je presedan u istoriji Amerike i sveta. Ima li neko objasnjenje za ovu pojavu, ili samo da je prihvatimo kao takvu? Mislim, u pitanju je prilicno ozbiljna stvar, po mom misljenju. ŠBRŽ, iliti Sta Bi Rekao Zizek na ovo?

Dusane, zaboravili ste Bora, Fajnmana i Lepu Brenu.

Are we in a war? Do we have an enemy?
SLAVOJ ZIZEK
London Review of Books, 23 May 2002

When Donald Rumsfeld designated the imprisoned Taliban fighters 'unlawful combatants' (as opposed to 'regular' prisoners of war), he did not simply mean that their criminal terrorist activity placed them outside the law: when an American citizen commits a crime, even one as serious as murder, he remains a 'lawful criminal'. The distinction between criminals and non-criminals has no relation to that between 'lawful' citizens and the people referred to in France as the 'Sans Papiers'. Perhaps the category of homo sacer, brought back into use by Giorgio Agamben in Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1998), is more useful here. It designated, in ancient Roman law, someone who could be killed with impunity and whose death had, for the same reason, no sacrificial value. Today, as a term denoting exclusion, it can be seen to apply not only to terrorists, but also to those who are on the receiving end of humanitarian aid (Rwandans, Bosnians, Afghans), as well as to the Sans Papiers in France and the inhabitants of the favelas in Brazil or the African American ghettoes in the US.

Concentration camps and humanitarian refugee camps are, paradoxically, the two faces, 'inhuman' and 'human', of one sociological matrix. Asked about the German concentration camps in occupied Poland, 'Concentration Camp' Erhardt (in Lubitsch's To Be or Not to Be) snaps back: 'We do the concentrating, and the Poles do the camping.' A similar distinction applies to the Enron bankruptcy, which can be seen as an ironic comment on the notion of a risk society. Thousands of employees who lost their jobs and savings were certainly exposed to a risk, but without having any real choice: what was risk to those in the know was blind fate to them. Those who did have a sense of the risks, the top managers, also had a chance to intervene in the situation, but chose instead to minimise the risk to themselves by cashing in their stocks and options before the bankruptcy - actual risks and choices were thus nicely distributed. In the risk society, in other words, some (the Enron managers) have the choices, while others (the employees) take the risks.

The logic of homo sacer is clearly discernible in the way the Western media report from the occupied West Bank: when the Israeli Army, in what Israel itself describes as a 'war' operation, attacks the Palestinian police and sets about systematically destroying the Palestinian infrastructure, Palestinian resistance is cited as proof that we are dealing with terrorists. This paradox is inscribed into the very notion of a 'war on terror' - a strange war in which the enemy is criminalised if he defends himself and returns fire with fire. Which brings me back to the 'unlawful combatant', who is neither enemy soldier nor common criminal. The al-Qaida terrorists are not enemy soldiers, nor are they simple criminals - the US rejected out of hand any notion that the WTC attacks should be treated as apolitical criminal acts. In short, what is emerging in the guise of the Terrorist on whom war is declared is the unlawful combatant, the political Enemy excluded from the political arena.

This is another aspect of the new global order: we no longer have wars in the old sense of a conflict between sovereign states in which certain rules apply (to do with the treatment of prisoners, the prohibition of certain weapons etc). Two types of conflict remain: struggles between groups of homo sacer - 'ethnic-religious conflicts' which violate the rules of universal human rights, do not count as wars proper, and call for a 'humanitarian pacifist' intervention on the part of the Western powers - and direct attacks on the US or other representatives of the new global order, in which case, again, we do not have wars proper, but merely 'unlawful combatants' resisting the forces of universal order. In this second case, one cannot even imagine a neutral humanitarian organisation like the Red Cross mediating between the warring parties, organising an exchange of prisoners and so on, because one side in the conflict - the US-dominated global force - has already assumed the role of the Red Cross, in that it does not perceive itself as one of the warring sides, but as a mediating agent of peace and global order, crushing rebellion and, simultaneously, providing humanitarian aid to the 'local population'.

This weird 'coincidence of opposites' reached its peak when, a few months ago, Harald Nesvik, a right-wing member of the Norwegian Parliament, proposed George W. Bush and Tony Blair as candidates for the Nobel Peace Prize, citing their decisive role in the 'war on terror'. Thus the Orwellian motto 'War is Peace' finally becomes reality, and military action against the Taliban can be presented as a way to guarantee the safe delivery of humanitarian aid. We no longer have an opposition between war and humanitarian aid: the same intervention can function at both levels simultaneously. The toppling of the Taliban regime is presented as part of the strategy to help the Afghan people oppressed by the Taliban; as Tony Blair said, we may have to bomb the Taliban in order to secure food transportation and distribution. Perhaps the ultimate image of the 'local population' as homo sacer is that of the American war plane flying above Afghanistan: one can never be sure whether it will be dropping bombs or food parcels.

This concept of homo sacer allows us to understand the numerous calls to rethink the basic elements of contemporary notions of human dignity and freedom that have been put out since 11 September. Exemplary here is Jonathan Alter's Newsweek article 'Time to Think about Torture' (5 November 2001), with the ominous subheading: 'It's a new world, and survival may well require old techniques that seemed out of the question.' After flirting with the Israeli idea of legitimising physical and psychological torture in cases of extreme urgency (when we know a terrorist prisoner possesses information which may save hundreds of lives), and 'neutral' statements like 'Some torture clearly works,' it concludes:

"We can't legalise torture; it's contrary to American values. But even as we continue to speak out against human-rights abuses around the world, we need to keep an open mind about certain measures to fight terrorism, like court-sanctioned psychological interrogation. And we'll have to think about transferring some suspects to our less squeamish allies, even if that's hypocritical. Nobody said this was going to be pretty."

The obscenity of such statements is blatant. First, why single out the WTC attack as justification? Have there not been more horrible crimes in other parts of the world in recent years? Secondly, what is new about this idea? The CIA has been instructing its Latin American and Third World military allies in the practice of torture for decades. Even the 'liberal' argument cited by Alan Dershowitz is suspect: 'I'm not in favour of torture, but if you're going to have it, it should damn well have court approval.' When, taking this line a step further, Dershowitz suggests that torture in the 'ticking clock' situation is not directed at the prisoner's rights as an accused person (the information obtained will not be used in the trial against him, and the torture itself would not formally count as punishment), the underlying premise is even more disturbing, implying as it does that one should be allowed to torture people not as part of a deserved punishment, but simply because they know something. Why not go further still and legalise the torture of prisoners of war who may have information which could save the lives of hundreds of our soldiers? If the choice is between Dershowitz's liberal 'honesty' and old-fashioned 'hypocrisy', we'd be better off sticking with 'hypocrisy'. I can well imagine that, in a particular situation, confronted with the proverbial 'prisoner who knows', whose words can save thousands, I might decide in favour of torture; however, even (or, rather, precisely) in a case such as this, it is absolutely crucial that one does not elevate this desperate choice into a universal principle: given the unavoidable and brutal urgency of the moment, one should simply do it. Only in this way, in the very prohibition against elevating what we have done into a universal principle, do we retain a sense of guilt, an awareness of the inadmissibility of what we have done.

In short, every authentic liberal should see these debates, these calls to 'keep an open mind', as a sign that the terrorists are winning. And, in a way, essays like Alter's, which do not openly advocate torture, but just introduce it as a legitimate topic of debate, are even more dangerous than explicit endorsements. At this moment at least, explicitly endorsing it would be rejected as too shocking, but the mere introduction of torture as a legitimate topic allows us to court the idea while retaining a clear conscience. ('Of course I am against torture, but who is hurt if we just discuss it?') Admitting torture as a topic of debate changes the entire field, while outright advocacy remains merely idiosyncratic. The idea that, once we let the genie out of the bottle, torture can be kept within 'reasonable' bounds, is the worst liberal illusion, if only because the 'ticking clock' example is deceptive: in the vast majority of cases torture is not done in order to resolve a 'ticking clock' situation, but for quite different reasons (to punish an enemy or to break him down psychologically, to terrorise a population etc). Any consistent ethical stance has to reject such pragmatic-utilitarian reasoning. Here's a simple thought experiment: imagine an Arab newspaper arguing the case for torturing American prisoners; think of the explosion of comments about fundamentalist barbarism and disrespect for human rights that would cause.

When, at the beginning of April, the Americans got hold of Abu Zubaydah, presumed to be the second-in-command of al-Qaida, the question 'Should he be tortured?' was openly discussed in the media. In a statement broadcast by NBC on 5 April, Rumsfeld himself claimed that American lives were his first priority, not the human rights of a high-ranking terrorist, and attacked journalists for displaying such concern for Zubaydah's well-being, thus openly clearing the way for torture. Alan Dershowitz presented an even sorrier spectacle. His reservations concerned two particular points:

1. Zubaydah's is not a clear case of the 'ticking bomb' situation, i.e. it is not proven that he has the details of an imminent terrorist attack which could be prevented by gaining access to his knowledge through torture;

2. torturing him would not yet be legally covered - for that to happen, one would first have to engage in a public debate and then amend the US Constitution, while publicly proclaiming the respects in which the US would no longer follow the Geneva Convention regulating the treatment of enemy prisoners.

A notable precursor in this field of para-legal 'biopolitics', in which administrative measures are gradually replacing the rule of law, was Alfredo Stroessner's regime in Paraguay in the 1960s and 1970s, which took the logic of the state of exception to an absurd, still unsurpassed extreme. Under Stroessner, Paraguay was - with regard to its Constitutional order - a 'normal' parliamentary democracy with all freedoms guaranteed; however, since, as Stroessner claimed, we were all living in a state of emergency because of the worldwide struggle between freedom and Communism, the full implementation of the Constitution was forever postponed and a permanent state of emergency obtained. This state of emergency was suspended every four years for one day only, election day, to legitimise the rule of Stroessner's Colorado Party with a 90 per cent majority worthy of his Communist opponents. The paradox is that the state of emergency was the normal state, while 'normal' democratic freedom was the briefly enacted exception. This weird regime anticipated some clearly perceptible trends in our liberal-democratic societies in the aftermath of 11 September.

Is today's rhetoric not that of a global emergency in the fight against terrorism, legitimising more and more suspensions of legal and other rights? The ominous aspect of John Ashcroft's recent claim that 'terrorists use America's freedom as a weapon against us' carries the obvious implication that we should limit our freedom in order to defend ourselves. Such statements from top American officials, especially Rumsfeld and Ashcroft, together with the explosive display of 'American patriotism' after 11 September, create the climate for what amounts to a state of emergency, with the occasion it supplies for a potential suspension of rule of law, and the state's assertion of its sovereignty without 'excessive' legal constraints. America is, after all, as President Bush said immediately after 11 September, in a state of war. The problem is that America is, precisely, not in a state of war, at least not in the conventional sense of the term (for the large majority, daily life goes on, and war remains the exclusive business of state agencies). With the distinction between a state of war and a state of peace thus effectively blurred, we are entering a time in which a state of peace can at the same time be a state of emergency.

Such paradoxes also provide the key to the way in which the liberal-totalitarian emergency represented by the 'war on terror' relates to the authentic revolutionary state of emergency, first articulated by St Paul in his reference to the 'end of time'. When a state institution proclaims a state of emergency, it does so by definition as part of a desperate strategy to avoid the true emergency and return to the 'normal course of things'. It is, you will recall, a feature of all reactionary proclamations of a 'state of emergency' that they were directed against popular unrest ('confusion') and presented as a resolve to restore normalcy. In Argentina, in Brazil, in Greece, in Chile, in Turkey, the military who proclaimed a state of emergency did so in order to curb the 'chaos' of overall politicisation. In short, reactionary proclamations of a state of emergency are in actuality a desperate defence against the real state of emergency.

There is a lesson to be learned here from Carl Schmitt. The division friend/enemy is never just a recognition of factual difference. The enemy is by definition always (up to a point) invisible: it cannot be directly recognised because it looks like one of us, which is why the big problem and task of the political struggle is to provide/construct a recognisable image of the enemy. (Jews are the enemy par excellence not because they conceal their true image or contours but because there is ultimately nothing behind their deceiving appearances. Jews lack the 'inner form' that pertains to any proper national identity: they are a non-nation among nations, their national substance resides precisely in a lack of substance, in a formless, infinite plasticity.) In short, 'enemy recognition' is always a performative procedure which brings to light/constructs the enemy's 'true face'. Schmitt refers to the Kantian category Einbildungskraft, the transcendental power of imagination: in order to recognise the enemy, one has to 'schematise' the logical figure of the Enemy, providing it with the concrete features which will make it into an appropriate target of hatred and struggle.

After the collapse of the Communist states which provided the figure of the Cold War Enemy, the Western imagination entered a decade of confusion and inefficiency, looking for suitable schematisations of the Enemy, sliding from narco-cartel bosses to the succession of warlords of so-called 'rogue states' (Saddam, Noriega, Aidid, Milosevic) without stabilising itself in one central image; only with 11 September did this imagination regain its power by constructing the image of bin Laden, the Islamic fundamentalist, and al-Qaida, his 'invisible' network. What this means, furthermore, is that our pluralistic and tolerant liberal democracies remain deeply Schmittean: they continue to rely on political Einbildungskraft to provide them with the appropriate figure to render visible the invisible Enemy. Far from suspending the binary logic Friend/Enemy, the fact that the Enemy is defined as the fundamentalist opponent of pluralistic tolerance merely adds a reflexive twist to it. This 'renormalisation' has involved the figure of the Enemy undergoing a fundamental change: it is no longer the Evil Empire, i.e. another territorial entity, but an illegal, secret, almost virtual worldwide network in which lawlessness (criminality) coincides with 'fundamentalist' ethico-religious fanaticism - and since this entity has no positive legal status, the new configuration entails the end of international law which, at least from the onset of modernity, regulated relations between states.

When the Enemy serves as the 'quilting point' (the Lacanian point de capiton) of our ideological space, it is in order to unify the multitude of our actual political opponents. Thus Stalinism in the 1930s constructed the agency of Imperialist Monopoly Capital to prove that Fascists and Social Democrats ('Social Fascists') are 'twin brothers', the 'left and right hand of monopoly capital'. Thus Nazism constructed the 'plutocratic-Bolshevik plot' as the common agent threatening the welfare of the German nation. Capitonnage is the operation by means of which we identify/construct a sole agency that 'pulls the strings' behind a multitude of opponents. Exactly the same holds for today's 'war on terror', in which the figure of the terrorist Enemy is also a condensation of two opposed figures, the reactionary 'fundamentalist' and the Leftist resistant. The title of Bruce Barcott's article in the New York Times Magazine on 7 April, 'From Tree-Hugger to Terrorist', says it all: the real danger isn't from the Rightist fundamentalists who were responsible for the Oklahoma bombing and, in all probability, for the anthrax scare, but the Greens, who have never killed anyone. The ominous feature underlying all these phenomena is the metaphoric universalisation of the signifier 'terror'. The message of the latest American TV campaign against drugs is: 'When you buy drugs, you provide money for the terrorists!' 'Terror' is thus elevated to become the hidden point of equivalence between all social evils. How, then, are we to break out of this predicament?

An epochal event took place in Israel in January and February: hundreds of reservists refused to serve in the Occupied Territories. These refuseniks are not simply 'pacifists': in their public proclamations, they are at pains to emphasise that they have done their duty in fighting for Israel in the wars against the Arab states, in which some of them were highly decorated. What they claim is that they cannot accept to fight 'in order to dominate, expel, starve and humiliate an entire people'. Their claims are documented by detailed descriptions of atrocities committed by the Israel Defence Forces, from the killing of children to the destruction of Palestinian property. Here is how an IDF sergeant, Gil Nemesh, reports on the 'nightmare reality in the territories' at the protesters' website (http://www.seruv.org.il/):

My friends - forcing an elderly man to disgrace himself, hurting children, abusing people for fun, and later bragging about it, laughing about this terrible brutality. I am not sure I still want to call them my friends ... They let themselves lose their humanity, not out of pure viciousness, but because dealing with it in any other way is too difficult.

Palestinians, and even Israeli Arabs (officially full citizens of Israel), are discriminated against in the allocation of water, in the ownership of land and countless other aspects of daily life. More important is the systematic micro-politics of psychological humiliation: Palestinians are treated, essentially, as evil children who have to be brought back to an honest life by stern discipline and punishment. Arafat, holed up and isolated in three rooms in his Ramallah compound, was requested to stop the terror as if he had full power over all Palestinians. There is a pragmatic paradox in the Israeli treatment of the Palestinian Authority (attacking it militarily, while at the same time requiring it to crack down on the terrorists in its own midst) by which the explicit message (the injunction to stop the terror) is subverted by the very mode of delivery of that message. Would it not be more honest to say that what is untenable about the Palestinian situation is that the PA is being asked by the Israelis to 'resist us, so that we can crush you'? In other words, what if the true aim of the present Israeli intrusion into Palestinian territory is not to prevent future terrorist attacks, but effectively to rule out any peaceful solution for the foreseeable " future?

For its part, the absurdity of the American view was perfectly rendered in a TV comment by Newt Gingrich on 1 April: 'Since Arafat effectively is the head of a terrorist organisation, we will have to depose him and replace him with a new democratic leader who will be ready to make a deal with the state of Israel.' This isn't an empty paradox. Hamid Karzai is already a 'democratic' leader externally imposed on a people. Whenever Afghanistan's 'interim leader' appears in our media, he wears clothes that cannot but appear as an attractive modernised version of traditional Afghan attire (a woollen cap and pullover beneath a more modern coat etc), his figure thus seeming to exemplify his mission, to combine modernisation with the best of Afghan traditions - no wonder, since this attire was dreamed up by a top Western designer. As such, Karzai is the best metaphor for the status of Afghanistan today.

What if there simply is no 'truly democratic' (in the American sense of the term) Palestinian silent majority? What if a 'democratically elected new leader' is even more anti-Israeli, which wouldn't be surprising since Israel has systematically applied the logic of collective responsibility and punishment, destroying the houses of the entire extended family of suspected terrorists? The point is not the cruel and arbitrary treatment of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories but that they are reduced to the status of homo sacer, objects of disciplinary measures and/or even humanitarian help, but not full citizens. And what the refuseniks have achieved is a reconceptualisation of the Palestinian from homo sacer to 'neighbour': they treat Palestinians not as 'equal full citizens', but as neighbours in the strict Judeo-Christian sense. And there resides the difficult ethical test for contemporary Israelis: 'Love thy neighbour' means 'Love the Palestinian,' or it means nothing at all.

This refusal, significantly downplayed by the major media, is an authentic ethical act. It is here, in such acts, that, as Paul would have put it, there effectively are no longer Jews or Palestinians, full members of the polity and homines sacri. One should be unabashedly Platonic here: this 'No!' designates the miraculous moment in which eternal Justice momentarily appears in the sphere of empirical reality. An awareness of moments like this is the best antidote to the anti-semitic temptation often clearly detectable among critics of Israeli politics.

Slavoj Zizek is a philosopher, a pyschoanalyst and a researcher at the University of Llubljana. His books include The Ticklish Subject, Welcome to the Desert of the Real and The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity.

Other articles by Slavoj Zizek on FromOccupiedPalestine:
"The Iraqi McGuffin", Lacan.com, 11 April 2003

OK, hvala. Dobio sam odgovor: nije idol. To sam pitao.

koji su p-ostali kriticari drustvene stvarnosti pod stare dane



N.B. "Kurziv je moj"

N.N.B. Ogradjujem se unapred od nesporazuma sa jezickim i drugim cistuncima , a u vezi sa prelascima, dolascima, silascima autora u polje politicke teorije ili jos bolje , ovakvog, politickog vizionarstva. S obzirom da je Ajnstajn imao 70 godina kada je pisao sledece redove, moze se bez senke sumnje zakljuciti da je par godina pred smrt presao u marksiste (deo u kurzivu je direktno inspirisan Marksovim analizama) ili da je to oduvek bio.

N.N.N.B. Postoje nagadjanja, doduse ne i neosnovana, da je clanak pisan u klimi opsteg Makartzima i "crvenog terora", trebalo da nosi naziv " Zasto komunizam?" , ali da je Ajnstajn, covek sa preko 1000 stranica FBI dosijea odlucio da u sveprisutnoj anti-komunistickoj paranoji ( koja btw nije nikada prestala) sebi za dlaku olaksa zivot. Sustina je reklo bi se , ipak, ostala nepreimenovana.



Why Socialism?
by Albert Einstein

This essay was originally published in the first issue of Monthly Review (May 1949).

Is it advisable for one who is not an expert on economic and social issues to express views on the subject of socialism? I believe for a number of reasons that it is.

Let us first consider the question from the point of view of scientific knowledge. It might appear that there are no essential methodological differences between astronomy and economics: scientists in both fields attempt to discover laws of general acceptability for a circumscribed group of phenomena in order to make the interconnection of these phenomena as clearly understandable as possible. But in reality such methodological differences do exist. The discovery of general laws in the field of economics is made difficult by the circumstance that observed economic phenomena are often affected by many factors which are very hard to evaluate separately. In addition, the experience which has accumulated since the beginning of the so-called civilized period of human history has—as is well known—been largely influenced and limited by causes which are by no means exclusively economic in nature. For example, most of the major states of history owed their existence to conquest. The conquering peoples established themselves, legally and economically, as the privileged class of the conquered country. They seized for themselves a monopoly of the land ownership and appointed a priesthood from among their own ranks. The priests, in control of education, made the class division of society into a permanent institution and created a system of values by which the people were thenceforth, to a large extent unconsciously, guided in their social behavior.

But historic tradition is, so to speak, of yesterday; nowhere have we really overcome what Thorstein Veblen called "the predatory phase" of human development. The observable economic facts belong to that phase and even such laws as we can derive from them are not applicable to other phases. Since the real purpose of socialism is precisely to overcome and advance beyond the predatory phase of human development, economic science in its present state can throw little light on the socialist society of the future.

Second, socialism is directed towards a social-ethical end. Science, however, cannot create ends and, even less, instill them in human beings; science, at most, can supply the means by which to attain certain ends. But the ends themselves are conceived by personalities with lofty ethical ideals and—if these ends are not stillborn, but vital and vigorous—are adopted and carried forward by those many human beings who, half unconsciously, determine the slow evolution of society.

For these reasons, we should be on our guard not to overestimate science and scientific methods when it is a question of human problems; and we should not assume that experts are the only ones who have a right to express themselves on questions affecting the organization of society.

Innumerable voices have been asserting for some time now that human society is passing through a crisis, that its stability has been gravely shattered. It is characteristic of such a situation that individuals feel indifferent or even hostile toward the group, small or large, to which they belong. In order to illustrate my meaning, let me record here a personal experience. I recently discussed with an intelligent and well-disposed man the threat of another war, which in my opinion would seriously endanger the existence of mankind, and I remarked that only a supra-national organization would offer protection from that danger. Thereupon my visitor, very calmly and coolly, said to me: "Why are you so deeply opposed to the disappearance of the human race?"

I am sure that as little as a century ago no one would have so lightly made a statement of this kind. It is the statement of a man who has striven in vain to attain an equilibrium within himself and has more or less lost hope of succeeding. It is the expression of a painful solitude and isolation from which so many people are suffering in these days. What is the cause? Is there a way out?

It is easy to raise such questions, but difficult to answer them with any degree of assurance. I must try, however, as best I can, although I am very conscious of the fact that our feelings and strivings are often contradictory and obscure and that they cannot be expressed in easy and simple formulas.

Man is, at one and the same time, a solitary being and a social being. As a solitary being, he attempts to protect his own existence and that of those who are closest to him, to satisfy his personal desires, and to develop his innate abilities. As a social being, he seeks to gain the recognition and affection of his fellow human beings, to share in their pleasures, to comfort them in their sorrows, and to improve their conditions of life. Only the existence of these varied, frequently conflicting, strivings accounts for the special character of a man, and their specific combination determines the extent to which an individual can achieve an inner equilibrium and can contribute to the well-being of society. It is quite possible that the relative strength of these two drives is, in the main, fixed by inheritance. But the personality that finally emerges is largely formed by the environment in which a man happens to find himself during his development, by the structure of the society in which he grows up, by the tradition of that society, and by its appraisal of particular types of behavior. The abstract concept "society" means to the individual human being the sum total of his direct and indirect relations to his contemporaries and to all the people of earlier generations. The individual is able to think, feel, strive, and work by himself; but he depends so much upon society—in his physical, intellectual, and emotional existence—that it is impossible to think of him, or to understand him, outside the framework of society. It is "society" which provides man with food, clothing, a home, the tools of work, language, the forms of thought, and most of the content of thought; his life is made possible through the labor and the accomplishments of the many millions past and present who are all hidden behind the small word “society.”

It is evident, therefore, that the dependence of the individual upon society is a fact of nature which cannot be abolished—just as in the case of ants and bees. However, while the whole life process of ants and bees is fixed down to the smallest detail by rigid, hereditary instincts, the social pattern and interrelationships of human beings are very variable and susceptible to change. Memory, the capacity to make new combinations, the gift of oral communication have made possible developments among human being which are not dictated by biological necessities. Such developments manifest themselves in traditions, institutions, and organizations; in literature; in scientific and engineering accomplishments; in works of art. This explains how it happens that, in a certain sense, man can influence his life through his own conduct, and that in this process conscious thinking and wanting can play a part.

Man acquires at birth, through heredity, a biological constitution which we must consider fixed and unalterable, including the natural urges which are characteristic of the human species. In addition, during his lifetime, he acquires a cultural constitution which he adopts from society through communication and through many other types of influences. It is this cultural constitution which, with the passage of time, is subject to change and which determines to a very large extent the relationship between the individual and society. Modern anthropology has taught us, through comparative investigation of so-called primitive cultures, that the social behavior of human beings may differ greatly, depending upon prevailing cultural patterns and the types of organization which predominate in society. It is on this that those who are striving to improve the lot of man may ground their hopes: human beings are not condemned, because of their biological constitution, to annihilate each other or to be at the mercy of a cruel, self-inflicted fate.

If we ask ourselves how the structure of society and the cultural attitude of man should be changed in order to make human life as satisfying as possible, we should constantly be conscious of the fact that there are certain conditions which we are unable to modify. As mentioned before, the biological nature of man is, for all practical purposes, not subject to change. Furthermore, technological and demographic developments of the last few centuries have created conditions which are here to stay. In relatively densely settled populations with the goods which are indispensable to their continued existence, an extreme division of labor and a highly-centralized productive apparatus are absolutely necessary. The time—which, looking back, seems so idyllic—is gone forever when individuals or relatively small groups could be completely self-sufficient. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that mankind constitutes even now a planetary community of production and consumption.

I have now reached the point where I may indicate briefly what to me constitutes the essence of the crisis of our time. It concerns the relationship of the individual to society. The individual has become more conscious than ever of his dependence upon society. But he does not experience this dependence as a positive asset, as an organic tie, as a protective force, but rather as a threat to his natural rights, or even to his economic existence. Moreover, his position in society is such that the egotistical drives of his make-up are constantly being accentuated, while his social drives, which are by nature weaker, progressively deteriorate. All human beings, whatever their position in society, are suffering from this process of deterioration. Unknowingly prisoners of their own egotism, they feel insecure, lonely, and deprived of the naive, simple, and unsophisticated enjoyment of life. Man can find meaning in life, short and perilous as it is, only through devoting himself to society.

The economic anarchy of capitalist society as it exists today is, in my opinion, the real source of the evil. We see before us a huge community of producers the members of which are unceasingly striving to deprive each other of the fruits of their collective labor—not by force, but on the whole in faithful compliance with legally established rules. In this respect, it is important to realize that the means of production—that is to say, the entire productive capacity that is needed for producing consumer goods as well as additional capital goods—may legally be, and for the most part are, the private property of individuals.

For the sake of simplicity, in the discussion that follows I shall call “workers” all those who do not share in the ownership of the means of production—although this does not quite correspond to the customary use of the term. The owner of the means of production is in a position to purchase the labor power of the worker. By using the means of production, the worker produces new goods which become the property of the capitalist. The essential point about this process is the relation between what the worker produces and what he is paid, both measured in terms of real value. Insofar as the labor contract is “free,” what the worker receives is determined not by the real value of the goods he produces, but by his minimum needs and by the capitalists' requirements for labor power in relation to the number of workers competing for jobs. It is important to understand that even in theory the payment of the worker is not determined by the value of his product.

Private capital tends to become concentrated in few hands, partly because of competition among the capitalists, and partly because technological development and the increasing division of labor encourage the formation of larger units of production at the expense of smaller ones. The result of these developments is an oligarchy of private capital the enormous power of which cannot be effectively checked even by a democratically organized political society. This is true since the members of legislative bodies are selected by political parties, largely financed or otherwise influenced by private capitalists who, for all practical purposes, separate the electorate from the legislature. The consequence is that the representatives of the people do not in fact sufficiently protect the interests of the underprivileged sections of the population. Moreover, under existing conditions, private capitalists inevitably control, directly or indirectly, the main sources of information (press, radio, education). It is thus extremely difficult, and indeed in most cases quite impossible, for the individual citizen to come to objective conclusions and to make intelligent use of his political rights.

The situation prevailing in an economy based on the private ownership of capital is thus characterized by two main principles: first, means of production (capital) are privately owned and the owners dispose of them as they see fit; second, the labor contract is free. Of course, there is no such thing as a pure capitalist society in this sense. In particular, it should be noted that the workers, through long and bitter political struggles, have succeeded in securing a somewhat improved form of the “free labor contract” for certain categories of workers. But taken as a whole, the present day economy does not differ much from “pure” capitalism.

Production is carried on for profit, not for use. There is no provision that all those able and willing to work will always be in a position to find employment; an “army of unemployed” almost always exists. The worker is constantly in fear of losing his job. Since unemployed and poorly paid workers do not provide a profitable market, the production of consumers' goods is restricted, and great hardship is the consequence. Technological progress frequently results in more unemployment rather than in an easing of the burden of work for all. The profit motive, in conjunction with competition among capitalists, is responsible for an instability in the accumulation and utilization of capital which leads to increasingly severe depressions. Unlimited competition leads to a huge waste of labor, and to that crippling of the social consciousness of individuals which I mentioned before.

This crippling of individuals I consider the worst evil of capitalism. Our whole educational system suffers from this evil. An exaggerated competitive attitude is inculcated into the student, who is trained to worship acquisitive success as a preparation for his future career.

I am convinced there is only one way to eliminate these grave evils, namely through the establishment of a socialist economy, accompanied by an educational system which would be oriented toward social goals. In such an economy, the means of production are owned by society itself and are utilized in a planned fashion. A planned economy, which adjusts production to the needs of the community, would distribute the work to be done among all those able to work and would guarantee a livelihood to every man, woman, and child. The education of the individual, in addition to promoting his own innate abilities, would attempt to develop in him a sense of responsibility for his fellow men in place of the glorification of power and success in our present society.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to remember that a planned economy is not yet socialism. A planned economy as such may be accompanied by the complete enslavement of the individual. The achievement of socialism requires the solution of some extremely difficult socio-political problems: how is it possible, in view of the far-reaching centralization of political and economic power, to prevent bureaucracy from becoming all-powerful and overweening? How can the rights of the individual be protected and therewith a democratic counterweight to the power of bureaucracy be assured?

Clarity about the aims and problems of socialism is of greatest significance in our age of transition. Since, under present circumstances, free and unhindered discussion of these problems has come under a powerful taboo, I consider the foundation of this magazine to be an important public service.

Dusane,

Imam utisak da je Vas post mnogo bolje posecen nego sto to cifre govore. Pogledajte naslove koji su usledili odmah posle Vaseg " Zizek o Kosovu, Srbima i Albancima":

"Blogorama o muskarcima, zenama i odlucivanju" i zatim,

"Srbi o Kosovu i Evropi".

Ne znam kako treba da tumacim ovu upadljivu homologiju, osim kao odgovor na Vas post, odnosno na Zizekovu pojavu.

Dusane,

Imam utisak da je Vas post mnogo bolje posecen nego sto to cifre govore. Pogledajte naslove koji su usledili odmah posle Vaseg " Zizek o Kosovu, Srbima i Albancima":

"Blogorama o muskarcima, zenama i odlucivanju" i zatim,

"Srbi o Kosovu i Evropi".

Ne znam kako treba da tumacim ovu upadljivu homologiju, osim kao odgovor na Vas post, odnosno na Zizekovu pojavu.

P.S.

Zizek po pravilu izaziva burne reakcije, kao sto je vec rekao neko od blogera. U Srbiji, medjutim, jedina reakcija na Slavoja Zizeka jeste cutanje ili, bolje, precutkivanje. Ali, ne moram Vas da podsecam koliko je cutanje recito ili koliko tisina govori... sve su to varijacije na Vama dobro poznatu temu....

Zizek po pravilu izaziva burne reakcije, kao sto je vec rekao neko od blogera. U Srbiji, medjutim, jedina reakcija na Slavoja Zizeka jeste cutanje ili, bolje, precutkivanje. Ali, ne moram Vas da podsecam koliko je cutanje recito ili koliko tisina govori... sve su to varijacije na Vama dobro poznatu temu....

Mislite na ono "...nema govora bez odgovora, čak ako ga dočekuje samo ćutanje...."?

Mislim, takodje, na ono "da ce secanje na onaj drugi dogadjaj ostati veoma zivo cak i pod cenzurom - isto kao sto je prisilna amnezija jedna od najzivljih formi secanja - sve dok bude bilo ljudi koji svoj revolt budu stavljali u sluzbu borbe za politicku vlast proletarijata, odnosno ljudi za koje ce kljucne reci dijalektickog materijalizma imati smisao."

Za sve koji se pitaju sta Zizek, posle svega, tvrdi


A ne mislite li da je mozda naprosto u pitanju osecaj blizak panici?

Osnivac liberalno-demokratske partije Slovenije, Slavoj. Z, odbacio je zablude svetog trojstva demokratskog parlamentarizma (gradjansko drusto- politika "Dobra" - zajednicko trziste) i , doduse mnogo godina kasnije, postao najvatreniji kriticar dogme burzoaske paralementarne "demokratije".

Njegova poslednja dela " Robespjer, izmedju vrline i terora ", kao i "Na rubu revolucije ( Zizek komentarise Lenjina)" u tom su smislu korisni prilozi promisljanja politike koja se drznula da izadje iz zadatih okvira liberalizma, tj domacih zadaca koju vredni skolarci kapitalisticke integracije stavljaju pred sebe i , ubedjeni da cine Dobro, pred sve nas.

Neka hvala, izmedju kuge i kolere, cujem kako neko dovikuje -probacu da se izlecim sam. Dok prilazim, shvatam da nas je nevernika* vise. Za pocetak uvek dovoljno.

*Nevernici u neizlecive bolesti. U daljem tekstu NNB.