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Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for Equality?
Jasmina Tesanovic (26 Avgust, 2006 - 11:25)
http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/memoranda/memo84.pdf
4 The majority of female Muslim activists are
aware of the prevalent aversion in society to Western feminism and
are even party to this aversion, and therefore maintain that the way to improve women’s status withinsociety and the family is within the dominant normative order.
This is done byintroducing into Muslim annals the “Her Story”15 – history viewed through the role of women, thus magnifying that role; and through an alternative interpretation ofthe canonical sources and biographies of Muslim women, a method
notably pursued by Fatima Mernissi, an activist feminist professor of sociology from Morocco.16Following a similar strategy, Islamist female activists exhibit in
the conduct of their daily life both a principled rejection of Western values and the internalization of theirrole as guardians of Muslim authenticity.17 What Muslim women say by
embracing
the existing order is: we don’t want to – or cannot – adopt your way.
We have our
own way that is superior as well as effective, based on rational
causality that derives
from our basic principles and is accepted by society.
Their strategy has proven effective. Accepting the injunctions of
Islam, whether
in theory or in practice – such as adopting the hijab, the new
version of Islamic dress
– lifts the ban on female visibility in non-familial male society,
frees women of their
exclusive assignation to the private sphere, and affords them a
foothold, freedom of
movement and activity, and even authority in the public sphere,
though short of the
ultimate top position in government. Indeed, the more groups and
organizations
are closer to Islam, the more they encourage their women to
participate in public
activities.18 Their dissent from the Western version of libertine
feminism, which in
addition to subverting morals positions women against men, mitigates
the threat
it poses both to the aspiration for cosmic purity that hinges on
female conduct as
well as to the patriarchal order in the family (even if this is not
explicitly stated),
and to the Muslim conception of the harmonious society composed of
mutually
complementing camps, male and female.
However, Muslim public discourse does not stop at ousting the West from
its position as a benchmark for universal values. That would merely
constitute
parochial disavowal and limiting the validity of Western values to
the realm of the
Western world as a product of the specific course of Western history,
falling short of
its essential refutation. It would mean that it is right for them,
but not for us – but
not constitute a fundamental denial. Islamic spokesmen have
previously attempted
to refute the Western viewpoint but mostly in connection with its
secularism,
56 Rivka Yadlin
claiming that it makes the entire world order dependent on man, who
is fickle and
ephemeral.19 Increasingly however, whether as a reaction to the
Western “assault” or
the confidence gained by subaltern cultures in the time of
multiculturalism, Muslim
(not necessarily Islamic) discourse now pushes further, and tries to
debunk Western
liberalism and its claims concerning Muslim women, not merely through
the use of
the limited parochial rationalization of Islam, but also on the home
court of Western
discourse, using the latter’s own tools. This method poses a more
defying challenge
to a broader public, including the Western world.
A model example of this trend is Saba Mahmood, an Egyptian-born Muslim
feminist, anthropologist, and scholar of religious movements, well-
regarded
and highly active in the top level of Western academe (Princeton,
Chicago, and
Cambridge). Mahmood challenges Western liberalism on the whole,20
asserting
that it is a mistake to assume that human agency (a sociological term
connoting the
ability of autonomous human action to achieve self-fulfillment – a
cornerstone of the
definition of freedom in Western liberal philosophy) necessarily
means an internal
personal and natural aspiration of an individual for freedom and
quasi-Promethean
self-construction. It is a mistake to assume that human agency is the
drive to rise up
against authority and, as far as women are concerned, defy the
structures of male
control.
This mistaken assumption triggers deprecatory reactions by feminists
across
the political spectrum regarding the support and participation of
women in the
Islamic movements. A common allegation is that these women are held
captive in
a widespread patriarchal plan, and that if they were released from
their shackles,
they would naturally express their instinctive abhorrence of the
traditional Islamic
practices by which they are bound, particularly at a time in which
the opportunities
for freedom are so great. The fact is, according to Mahmood, that at
the heart of
Muslim women’s conduct lies the principle of sabr – the well-known
concept of
patience. Thus accepting polygamy, for example, is not considered
by pious Muslim
women as submission to injustice, but rather a demonstration of the
virtue of sabr.
Even more conspicuous is the issue of the hijab. Many studies,
including those by
Muslim feminists, define the desire to wear it according to the
researchers’ own
criteria, hence reaching the conclusion that the motive is social
protest, economic
need, alienation, or utilitarian strategy. The reasons cited by most
veiled women –
morality, religion, and values – are dismissed as the imageries of
oppressed people.
Wrong, says Mahmood. These responses are based on the assumption that
in
order for an individual to be free, her actions must be the
consequence of her own
Female Martyrdom: The Ultimate Embodiment of Islamic Existence? 57
will, not of customs, tradition, or plain enforcement. However, she
argues, it is
logical to assume as well that it is possible that the autonomous
will of an individual
and its self-realization are directed towards non-liberal goals that
are consistent
with customs and tradition. It is likewise logical to assume that it
is possible that an
active and autonomous human agency aspires not necessarily to
progressive goals
of change and rebellion against social conventions, such as wearing
jeans and dying
one’s hair blue, but to finding purpose, value, and pride in an
effort to preserve
tradition and stability and embody them in the appropriate way of life.
The liberal view regards this as the internalization by women of
their (oppressive)
socialization. It is possible, however, to regard it as an active
will to adopt the
standards set for women by divine commandment, and make them their own
through both external behavior and the construction of a coherent
spiritual stance
that is entrenched and integral to the point where women feel true
discomfort when
values relevant to women are not applied. This discomfort applies not
only to the
conduct of the individual herself, but also to the behavior of the
surrounding society,
behavior that reduces the meaning of Islam to an abstract system of
beliefs that does
not directly affect the daily life of the individual – how to dress,
how to speak, which
hobbies are proper, how to invest money, and what form public
discourse should
take. It can be a process of a conscious effort to reorient
aspirations by creating
harmony between internal motives, external actions, tendencies, and
emotional
states through repeated practice of moral deeds.
Furthermore, drawing on Michel Foucault, Mahmood argues that power
should
not be understood merely according to the simplistic binary model of
domination/
submission. The ability to act is created and made possible by given
relationships of
submission that are not necessarily passive. It is composed of
struggle, effort, and
achievements. Power in this sense is the way in which someone carries
out acts on his/
her thought, body, behavior, and modes of existence in order to
achieve a certain state
of happiness, purity, wisdom, soundness, or eternal life. According
to this definition,
resisting a relationship of domination is only one form of
appropriating an active
human agency; forms of accepting domination and hierarchy may also
achieve such
a state. The Muslim piety movement, researched by Mahmood in Egypt,
assumes
the existence of a divine plan for human life, as expressed in the
Qur’an, its exegeses,
the model of the prophet and his companions, and the moral laws
derived from
them, and every individual must strive, with no legal or other
compulsion, to realize
this plan. In a context in which there is no separating line between
the aspirations
of the individual and the conduct enjoined by society, submission to
certain forms
58 Rivka Yadlin
of external authority is a necessary condition for realizing an
individual’s potential,
i.e., constituting an active human agency.
Mahmood furthermore suggests that the formative role of the social
context of
the individual should be considered in a major way. The individual
and her conduct
are themselves a product of sanctioned traditions that far exceed in
their logic and
power the consciousness of the individual formed by them. It is not
possible to
identify a universal range of a human activity – such as “resistance”
– outside the
framework of the ethical and political conditions where such
activities gain their
particular meaning.
Mahmood’s argument does not directly address the phenomenon of female
suicide bombers, but neither does it restrict its conclusions to the
researched group
of the Egyptian Piety movement and may be applied to the issue at
hand and offer an
additional angle for analysis. First, in Palestinian society, as in
Arab/Muslim society
in general, religious devotion is an organizing norm for the ideals
the society uplifts.
The ideal of women’s status and proper conduct, especially when
intertwined with a
strong national sentiment and intense mobilization to glorified
warfare for a concrete
and immediate goal, situates female martyrs in the center of the
social consensus,
rather than the margins. Second, the aspiration for the embodiment of
the Islamic
ideal of existence that emerges in Mahmood’s research may be applied
as well to the
Palestinian martyrs, who perform the ultimate embodiment – the
sacrifice of their
body. The plausibility of their act as an autonomous choice for self-
realization through
acceptance of the prevalent norms in their society, and perhaps most
importantly the
formation of their autonomous consciousness by their society, further
situates them
in a consensual position, rather than in one motivated by aberrancy.
The Western liberal view may find it difficult to accept Mahmood’s
claim
concerning its own relativity and the partial role of its secular
morality and
rationalism in containing the modes of worthy human creativity, even
when it relies
on Western philosophers such as Pierre Bourdieu, Foucault, and a
number of the
most prominent Western feminists.21 This liberal view, however,
should take notice
of this trend as a demonstration of the firm tendency in Muslim
discourse to reject
Western views on women’s liberation, as well as other liberal Western
views – such
as democratization – and the ensuing Western demands and pressures
for social and
political change. It should also take notice of the fact that this
rejection is intensifying
and becoming more self-confident, no longer challenging out of the
periphery of
Muslim orthodoxy, using Islamic parochial rationale, but rather in
the heart of the
Western public sphere, using what the West considers to be universal
terms.
Female Martyrdom: The Ultimate Embodiment of Islamic Existence? 59
Western researchers may find it easier to accept the claim made by
subaltern
cultures as well as by certain Western researchers, specifically
anthropologists,22 that
in order to observe in an informed way the conduct of the “other,”
even if “lacking”
according to their Western judgment, one must relate to the formative
surroundings
of the individual as a major factor in understanding her conduct.
Furthermore they
may not find it difficult to agree that if the individual in question
were formed by her
surrounding culture, it would include what she may consider as her
autonomous
choice. The ability of Western researchers to observe traditions that
are different
from their own from within those “other” traditions, while putting
aside their
own entrenched traditions and logic, may be an important contribution
to a better
understanding of action and political processes in those cultures.
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